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RACE TO THE PAYCHECK
Merit pay has long been a favored method in both the 
public and private sector to motivate employees and pro-
duce higher outcomes (Shaw, Duffy, Mitra, Lockhart, & 
Bowler, 2003). Despite mixed results on the effectiveness 
of merit pay, the public education sector has implemented 
merit pay programs throughout the 20th and 21st centu-
ries (Cohen & Murnane, 1985; Podgursky & Springer, 
2011). Some have lauded merit pay, asserting that with-
out rewarding teachers monetarily on the quality of work, 
“there is no incentive for a teacher to do a good job” (Fi-
glio & Kenny, 2007, p. 901). 
There are inconsistencies with findings related to the ef-
fectiveness of merit pay (Arrowsmith & Marginson, 2010; 
Dee & Keys, 2004; Figlio & Kenny, 2007; Kellough & 
Lu, 1993; Marsden & Richardson, 1994; Schaubroeck, 
Shaw, Duffy, & Mitra, 2008; Springer et al., 2010). Some 
scholars have attributed merit pay to increased productiv-
ity and motivation (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Chang, 
2006). Other researchers report that merit pay has an 
adverse effect on teacher productivity and motivation 
(Arrowsmith & Marginson, 2010; Kellough & Lu, 1993; 
Marsden & Richardson, 1994; Scott, Shaw, & Duffy, 
2008; Shaw et al., 2003). Not only are there differences 
in the findings of merit pay studies, there are differences 
in the conceptual frameworks that scholars have used to 
examine this important topic. 
Conceptual frameworks serve as lenses into a phenomenon 
and provide varying perspectives on the topic. Variables 
are operationalized in research studies depending upon 
the conceptual framework employed (Hoy & Miskel, 
2008). Researchers have analyzed merit pay through the 
lens of agency theory and expectancy theory with mixed 
results (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Chang, 2006; Cohen 
& Murnane, 1985; Figlio & Kenny, 2007; Kellough & Lu, 
1993; Oah & Lee, 2011; Scott et al., 2008; Shaw et al., 
2003; Sindelar, 2008). To date, few studies have examined 
the topic of merit pay through the lens of equity theory. 
Some have referred to equity theory as organizational 
justice, or creating environments that are equitable, con-
sistent, and free of self-interest (Greenberg & Colquitt, 
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2005). The purpose of this paper is to use equity theory to 
examine merit pay for public school teachers in a review of 
empirical studies over the past decade. Readers are chal-
lenged to consider the implications of merit pay in light of 
equity theory and resultant issues for educational policy 
and practice. 
MERIT PAY AND TEACHER EVALUATIONS
In the state of Tennessee, administrators and policymak-
ers are using federal Race to the Top funds to reform the 
way teachers are evaluated. The new teacher evaluation 
model leads to a merit pay process to reward teachers for 
“’improved student achievement and accept[ing] more re-
sponsibilities for lifting up their schools’” (Sarrio, 2009). 
There is a relationship between teacher effectiveness and 
student achievement; teachers can greatly enhance and 
impact student success. Furthermore, teacher evaluations 
have traditionally been instructionally-based with a focus 
on teacher pedagogy and instructional practices. How-
ever, the difference in the proposed evaluation process is 
that merit pay will incentivize student performance as a 
construct of teacher performance. Thus, the federal Race 
to the Top program has led several states, including Ten-
nessee, toward teacher evaluation instruments that incor-
porate outcome data in the form of student achievement. 
In most states, this is the first step in the plan to institute 
a pay for performance program for teachers, also known 
as merit pay. 
Merit pay has existed since the modern public education 
system (Cohen & Murnane, 1985). Currently, teacher 
compensation in most states is primarily based on educa-
tion level and years of experience (Podgursky & Springer, 
2011). This has not always been the case; incentive sys-
tems were more common in the early 20th century (Figlio 
& Kenny, 2007). Historically, merit pay programs have 
emerged in response to significant events where policy-
makers have blamed education as the impetus or cited 
education as the solution. Merit pay programs wanted af-
ter World War II, resurging after the launch of Sputnik, 
faded once again, and resurrected after the publication of 
A Nation at Risk (Pearce & Perry, 1983). Merit pay is once 
again becoming part of many educational reform move-
ments in the United States (Figlio & Kenny, 2007). As in 
the past, policymakers are criticizing public education for 
the downward turn in the country’s economic condition 
and world standing. In addition to this reaction-response 
merit pay implementation cycle, states that have long his-
tories of merit pay are still holding on to these pay systems 
even though the results do not show they have garnered 
any gains in student achievement (Kellough & Lu, 1993). 
THEORY
In the 1990s, agency theory emerged as the main theory 
guiding the research on merit pay (Bloom & Milkovich, 
1998). Agency theory is based on the assumption that 
people want to avoid risk or hard work and a supervisor 
must account for this by creating a compensation system 
that compels the worker to work while minimizing risk 
(Jensen, 1983). This theory is inadequate for studying 
merit pay in the current public education system since 
numerous studies have found teachers to be motivated 
by reasons other than economic (Besley & Ghatak, 2005; 
Cohen & Murnane, 1985; Kellough & Lu, 1993; Mars-
den & Richardson, 1994). The overarching assumption in 
agency theory is that agents, or teachers, need an econom-
ic reason to show up to work every day. Inherently absent 
in teacher merit pay studies with the lens of agency theory 
is the accommodation or inclusion of intrinsic variables 
of motivation, specifically non-economic variables in light 
of overwhelming evidence that a vast majority of public 
school teachers are intrinsically motivated. 
Expectancy theory has also been used as a theoretical basis 
for examining merit pay (Kellough & Lu, 1993). Expec-
tancy theory assumes that people “make decisions among 
alternative plans of behavior based on their perceptions or 
expectations of the degree to which given behaviors will 
lead to desired outcomes” (p. 47). When scholars have 
applied the constructs of expectancy theory to merit pay, 
they have likewise positioned teachers as economically 
motivated. In expectancy theory, teacher expectations are 
examined as a function of behavior. Studies have demon-
strated that teachers’ pedagogical decisions (or behaviors) 
are made with the expectations (or motivations) of in-
creased student learning. Expectancy theory posits teach-
er behavior is a function of expectations for an increase in 
compensation. 
Therefore, when examining the topic of merit pay, neither 
agency theory nor expectancy theory is appropriate since 
these two theories do not accommodate non-economic 
variables or motivations associated with teacher perfor-
mance. This could explain why merit pay has often been 
unsuccessfully adopted by school systems and is usually 
attacked by teacher unions (Arrowsmit & Marginson, 
2010). A better way to examine merit pay, teacher behav-
iors, and student achievement is to utilize equity theory as 
the conceptual framework. 
Equity theory is based on perceived fairness and wheth-
er individuals believe they are being treated fairly in an 
organization (Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005). Workers’ 
inputs and outputs are considered in equity theory. Ap-
plying equity theory to merit pay, compensation would be 
an input and work would be an output. One of the tenets 
of equity theory is that people are demotivated to work 
when they perceive their output is not equal to their input. 
If their input is intrinsic, then workers can directly relate 
their output to their input; however, if the focus of the in-
put is economic, then often workers have trouble relating 
their input to their output (Shaw et al., 2003). To illus-
trate, teachers who teach AP courses expect to give more 
output in the form of planning, grading, and preparation 
while their input is in the form of prestige for teaching the 
course and student scores on the AP exam both of which 
validate the extra time it takes to teach the course. 
Guided by equity theory, merit pay poses some potential 
threats to teacher morale and teaching performance. The 
ultimate goal of education is to advance student-learning 
(Wiggins & McTighe, 2007). If teachers are focused on 
student learning only as a function of their outputs, then 
their behaviors, or inputs, will exemplify this. When 
merit pay systems are introduced, however, the goal of 
the teacher changes to include outcomes that result in 
increased compensation. If goals are mastery-based, then 
they can enhance the performance of an individual work-
er because mastery will then become the input the worker 
expects for their output. If goals are monetary, then typi-
cally they can have dangerous “side effects”, such as fo-
cusing attention “so narrowly that people overlook other 
important features of a task” (Ordonez, Schweitzer, Ga-
linsky, & Braverman, 2009, p. 6). In education, this type 
of narrow focus has been manifested by unnoticed behav-
iors such as not teaching a rich curriculum in a narrow 
focus on state exams. More significantly, there have been 
increased occurrences of cheating on state-wide exams. 
While most teachers might not resort to cheating because 
of compensation, the brain reacts differently to monetary 
rewards than it does to other inputs (Knutson, Adams, 
Fong, & Hommer, 2001). This dopamine reaction could 
explain why goals and thus behavior changes once rewards 
are introduced. In essence, the teacher becomes “addicted 
to rewards” (Souvorov, 2003, para. 4) and will change her 
focus to earn the reward instead of, or in addition to, stu-
dent learning. As a result, merit pay carries some risk of 
changing teachers’ focus and, as a result, the mission of 
the school that a traditional compensation system does 
not. Alfie Kohn’s Punished by Rewards addressed the 
many unintended consequences that occur in educational 
settings when behavior is linked to rewards (Kohn, 1999).
The traditional teaching salary structure is viewed by 
many economists as inequitable, and scholars have ex-
amined whether unbalanced salaries for starting teachers 
cause teachers to leave their current school systems or to 
leave the career entirely (Podgursky & Springer, 2011). 
One limitation of equity theory as it applies to the sal-
ary structure is that teachers are giving similar outputs 
but receiving different inputs. However, teachers who are 
motivated by intrinsic motivators such as the mission of 
their school do not need rewards because the effects of 
the intrinsic already maximize productivity (Besley & 
Ghatak, 2005, p. 627). Moreover, Frey (1997) asserts that 
monetary rewards can have a negative effect on intrinsic 
motivation and productivity, particularly for those who 
are primarily intrinsically motivated. As a result, the in-
put-output assumption put forth by equity theory is not 
a good fit for education because it only addresses teachers 
who value the financial motivation to teach and ignores 
those who cite other reasons for choosing the career. 
DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Equity theory presents three major limitations of merit 
pay for teachers. The first is the limitation of what teach-
ers determine is fair. In merit pay systems, teachers who 
are doing the same job may not receive the same pay. A 
second implication for practice is the process of deciding 
how merit pay is allocated and implemented. Third, a fi-
nal implication for practice and limitation of merit pay in 
the lens of equity theory is that teachers of low aptitude, 
low performing students can be unnecessarily punished 
for student scores that are not under the teacher’s direct 
control. 
Important in the dialogue is that student achievement 
involves the student and the teacher. A computational al-
gorithm to calculate teacher pay as a function of student 
achievement, regardless of its sophistication, will be un-
able to capture and separate student effort from teacher 
effort. Giving teachers merit pay for student achievement 
on standardized tests has its own set of problems. Since 
not every teacher has a student-achievement test attached 
to her subject, merit pay could cause some “deterioration 
in the atmosphere at work, producing a degree of [faculty] 
jealousies and a decline in morale” (Marsden & Richard-
son, 1994, p. 258).
If merit pay is rewarded based on evaluations, then teach-
ers may focus more on bureaucratic process of having 
good teacher evaluations. It seems logical that these evalu-
ations would result in better teaching performance and 
increased student achievement, but students of teachers 
who were part of Tennessee’s former merit pay system 
called “Career Ladder” did not show significant gains on 
standardized tests based on a matrix of evaluations and 
other extra teaching duties. Instead, it was criticized “as 
overly burdensome [and] stressed cunning and endurance 
rather than merit” (Dee & Keys, 2004, p. 475). 
If a teacher’s focus is on student achievement on standard-
ized-tests, then this could result in the documented unin-
tentional, but consequential negative behaviors by teach-
ers who want to earn merit pay based on the results of the 
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tests. Merit pay could produce results similar to punitive 
procedures that have resulted in teachers falsifying results 
of standardized tests. 
Deciding who deserves to receive merit pay is also prob-
lematic from a point of view of equity. If teacher obser-
vations are used to determine merit pay, then under one 
of the current models that Tennessee is using, teachers 
with tenure are only observed for fifteen minutes on four 
separate occasions. In a 180 day school year, this does not 
seem adequate to determine how well someone is teach-
ing. A more robust model for evaluating teachers would 
be necessary, but it is unlikely teachers would invest the 
time into it to receive the reward (Dee & Keys, 2004). In 
addition, many workers are suspicious of having their pay 
tied to performance (Marsden & Richardson, 1994), and 
often feel like politics are part of what should be an ob-
jective evaluation (Salimaki & Jamsen, 2010). Percy and 
Pearce (1983) claim that the problems in this performance 
appraisal aspect make merit pay fail as a source of motiva-
tion. 
Despite all of the considerations, many school systems 
and the state of Tennessee continue exploring the adop-
tion of merit pay systems. Indeed, Mayor Rahm Emanuel 
recently announced the acquisition of $5 million to fund 
a merit pay plan for principals that will expand to teach-
ers (Spielman and Rossi, 2011). In the face of research and 
theories that suggest that merit pay does not work in pub-
lic education, it is still cyclically considered a bandage, if 
not panacea, for improvements in education. The public 
sector is loath to dismiss merit pay as an option because 
of its intuitive appeal as something that works in business 
(and where is the evidence that it works in business?); that 
teachers are finally going to be paid what they’re worth; 
it saves money by only rewarding teachers who deserve 
it; and, it works if you remove the glitches (Kellough & 
Lu, 1993). Negative aspects of merit pay can include poor 
teaching practices that seek only improved student perfor-
mance on exams, lowered teacher morale, and a lowered 
organization-based self-esteem (Scott, Shaw, & Duffy, 
2008). Whether examining merit pay through agency, ex-
pectancy, or equity theory, merit pay offers more problems 
than solutions.
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